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TOP COP OR REGULATORY FLOP? THE SEC AT 75
Jill E. Fisch*
I. INTRODUCTION

J

OHN Coffee and Hillary Sale’s article, Redesigning the SEC:
Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?,1 was written for a symposium celebrating the seventy-fifth birthday of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The celebration came at a most inopportune
time.
The
market
developments
of
October
2008―developments that took place contemporaneous with the
live presentations at the conference―reflected the most severe
capital market decline since the Great Depression. Over the course
of a few weeks, several of the country’s largest financial institutions
suffered critical or near-critical crises, requiring the injection of
unprecedented bailout funds. In a single week in October, 2008,
the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by more than 20%.2 In a
one-year period, the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000, reflecting most U.S.
publicly traded stocks, lost $8.4 trillion in value.3
More significantly, although the SEC has long been “the crown
jewel of the financial regulatory infrastructure,”4 recent developments have called that characterization into question. The SEC has
been the target of relentless criticism ranging from claims that it
mishandled derivatives regulation, oversight of securities firms, and
market risk, to assertions of delays and blunders and possible in-

*

Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
95 Va. L. Rev. 707 (2009).
2
E.S. Browning & Annelena Lobb, Market’s 7-Day Rout Leaves U.S. Reeling:
Stocks in a Slow-Motion Crash as Dow Drops Another 679 Points; After Year of Declines, Investors Lose $8.4 Trillion of Wealth, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at A1.
3
Id.
4
Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current Economic Crisis:
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 7 (2008)
(testimony of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Senior Advisor, The Carlyle Group), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/LEVITTBankingCommitteeTestimonyFINAL
101608.pdf.
1
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dustry capture at the Division of Enforcement.5 These criticisms
followed the Treasury Department’s Blueprint of Financial Regulation―released in March 2008—that criticized the SEC’s approach to regulation as obsolete and proposed a plan of regulatory
consolidation that would effectively lead to the agency’s demise.6
Most recently, the revelation that the SEC failed to discover a $50
billion Ponzi scheme at Madoff Investment Securities, despite having received allegations of wrongdoing for over a decade, suggests
fundamental weaknesses in its core enforcement operations.7
Given the serious questions as to whether the agency will live to
see eighty, it cannot be blamed for “crying” at this party.8
Coffee and Sale’s article focuses largely on the Blueprint. The
authors concur with the Treasury Department’s observations that
the existing regulatory structure is out of date, as well as its prescription for regulatory consolidation.9 In particular, Coffee and
Sale identify a number of key developments in the past twenty
years that have placed new pressure on regulators. These developments include the growth of behavioral economics and a corresponding loss of faith in the efficient capital market hypothesis, a
series of corporate governance and other financial scandals, and a
trend toward deregulation of the financial markets fueled by privatization and globalization.10
A regulatory structure that has failed to keep pace with financial
market developments increases this pressure. The historical divides
5

See generally Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of Inspector Gen., Report of Investigation: Case No. OIG-431; Re-Investigation of Claims by Gary Aguirre of Preferential Treatment and Improper Termination 187 (2008) [hereinafter Aguirre Report]
(finding that SEC officials “conducted themselves in a manner that raised serious
questions about the impartiality and fairness” of an insider-trading investigation),
available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg100708.pdf.
6
Dep’t of Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure 11–
13 (2008) [hereinafter Blueprint].
7
See, e.g., Associated Press, Congress Plans to Investigate Madoff Scheme; Mukasey Recuses Himself From Justice Probe, Law.com, Dec. 18, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202426854578 [hereinafter Congress Plans]
(quoting Chairman Cox as stating that “[c]redible and specific allegations regarding
Madoff’s financial wrongdoing going back to at least 1999 were repeatedly brought to
the attention of SEC staff”).
8
Lesley Gore, It’s My Party on The Best of Lesley Gore: The Millennium Collection (Mercury Records 2000).
9
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 774.
10
Id. at 710–14.
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that produced our existing regulatory structure—the divide between banks and securities firms, between securities and commodities, and between broker-dealers and investment advisors—have
eroded, leading to a system in which similar functions are under
the regulatory oversight of different agencies. In some cases this
system produces jurisdictional conflicts; in others, it may lead to
regulatory gaps. The growth of new financial products that do not
easily fit within the regulatory framework and risk analysis applicable to traditional securities, commodities, and insurance policies
expands these gaps. Thus, critics may reasonably question whether
the SEC and the regulatory structure as a whole have kept pace
with market developments.
Going forward, the capital markets crisis has added urgency to
the forces that motivated the Treasury Department’s Blueprint.
Market crises invariably lead to regulatory reform. Indeed, the
SEC owes its existence to the stock market crash of 1929 and the
subsequent Great Depression.11 The comparatively less severe
market reaction to the revelations of corporate misconduct at Enron, WorldCom, and various other companies led to the adoption
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.12 The recent crisis is no exception. The crisis has already generated unprecedented government
actions including extensive efforts to bail out private financial institutions. It is likely to produce major structural reforms as well.13
Coupled with the reform effort are a series of recent revelations of
seemingly blatant regulatory failures. In light of these developments, what role, if any, remains for the SEC?
Coffee and Sale offer a starting point. First, they look globally
for alternatives to the U.S. system, considering the structure of fi11
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the statute that established the SEC, explains the necessity for regulation as follows:
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified,
and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of
security prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets . . . .
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2006).
12
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
13
David M. Herszenhorn, Bush Signs Bill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2008, at A1 (reporting that Congress approved and President Bush signed a $700 billion economic bailout package).
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nancial regulation in other major capital markets and the forces
behind that structure.14 Second, they analyze the Commission’s responsibility for the 2008 financial crisis, focusing in particular on
the Consolidated Supervised Entity Program and its effect on the
leverage and risk management policies of the major investment
banks.15 Finally, they consider three of the Blueprint’s specific proposals for reform: 1) a switch from rules-based to principles-based
regulation; 2) preemption of state securities enforcement; and 3)
increased reliance on industry-based regulation, particularly delegation to self-regulatory organizations.16 Although Coffee and Sale
largely reject the Blueprint’s proposals, they ultimately concur with
the Blueprint’s prescription of regulatory consolidation and argue
that, in particular, banking regulators (and not the SEC) should
engage in prudential regulation of both financial institutions and
the markets.17
Coffee and Sale offer compelling reasons to rethink the SEC’s
role as prudential regulator for financial institutions. Their analysis, however, both of the SEC’s responsibility for the current crisis
and of its potential future role, is incomplete. If the fiscal crisis of
2008 has taught us anything, it is that the SEC’s traditional objectives of investor protection and disclosure transparency are critically important in maintaining the health of capital markets and
reining in the animal spirits that contribute to bubbles and fraud.
Developments dating back to before Coffee and Sale’s article as
well as more recent revelations demonstrate that the SEC’s failures
have extended into its core competencies of enforcement, financial
transparency, and investor protection.
Critically, this article will argue that the failures in financial
regulation cannot be passed off as the result of a “balkanized system.”18 If the SEC has failed, it is not because of regulatory gaps,
global competition, or the convergence of financial service providers, but a lack of functional effectiveness. By the same token, re-

14

Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 717–25.
Id. at 735–44.
16
Id. at 744–64.
17
Id. at 764–67.
18
Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec’y, Dep’t of Treasury, Remarks on Blueprint for Regulatory Reform (Mar. 31, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/hp897.htm).
15
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form does not depend on a massive overhaul of financial regulatory structure. The SEC’s survival requires a renewed emphasis on
leadership, increased independence, and enhanced oversight and
analysis of market developments.
I. THE COFFEE AND SALE ASSESSMENT OF THE BLUEPRINT
A. Regulatory Consolidations—Lessons from Abroad
Although they concur generally with the Blueprint’s prescription
for structural reform and regulatory consolidation, Coffee and Sale
convincingly attack many of the Blueprint’s specific claims and
proposals. First, and most important, they challenge Treasury’s
xenophilia. The Blueprint touts the regulatory approaches adopted
by the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Netherlands and argues
that the success of these approaches “reinforce[s] the importance
of revisiting the U.S. regulatory structure.”19 Coffee and Sale examine the historical background of non-U.S. reforms more closely and
conclude that the Blueprint’s history “involves an element of historical fiction.”20 Importantly, they highlight the irony of the Blueprint’s endorsement of the U.K. system. The United Kingdom’s
2000 reforms were adopted in specific response to the failures of
self-regulation. Yet, although it touts the U.K. approach, the Blueprint subsequently argues for increased reliance on self-regulation
rather than government oversight.21
More significantly, as many commentators have observed, the
organization of non-U.S. regulatory systems may not be well-suited
to address the unique characteristics of the U.S. financial markets.
Coffee and Sale identify several unique attributes of the U.S. system, including its high level of retail ownership, its level of enforcement intensity, and its reliance on equity-based compensation.22 Other factors also make the U.S. market distinctive. As John
Armour and Jeff Gordon observe, U.K. institutional ownership has
traditionally been relatively homogenous, enabling regulators to
rely on reputational constraints, while institutional ownership in

19

Blueprint, supra note 6, at 3.
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 726.
21
Blueprint, supra note 6, at 122–23.
22
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 727–31.
20
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the United States is heterogeneous.23 Moreover, U.S. law mandates
greater disclosure for public companies than that of other legal systems, disclosure that has become even more extensive under Sarbanes-Oxley.24 Finally and perhaps most significantly, the size and
scope of the U.S. securities industry is dramatically larger than that
of the United Kingdom (or any other country). As Don
Langevoort observes, for example, in the United Kingdom approximately 8,000 individuals were authorized to conduct customer
trades in 2005; in the United States, there were approximately
658,000 registered representatives in 2006.25
Nonetheless, Coffee and Sale support the basic proposition that
regulatory consolidation is warranted and that the basic structure
of a super-regulator that extends across institutional and functional
lines to regulate the financial industry more broadly is desirable.26
Significantly, Coffee and Sale approach, but do not directly address, the continued role of the SEC.
B. Regulatory Failures—The Consolidated Supervised Entities
Program
Coffee and Sale come closest to addressing the continued role of
the SEC when they consider the credit crisis of 2008 in an effort to
determine whether the crisis reflects a regulatory failure. In their
earlier draft, Coffee and Sale’s analysis of the SEC’s responsibility

23

See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Berle-Means Corporation in the 21st
Century 29–30 (Oct. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/currently/seminars/businesslawscholarship/papers/Gordon.
pdf).
24
See, e.g., id. at 22 (observing that the U.K. system did not impose liability for misleading statements directed to the secondary market until 2006).
25
Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of
the Securities Markets 8–9 (Aug. 27, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/georgetown/fwps/papers/80/); see also Testimony Concerning Investor Protection and Securities Fraud: Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance & Government-Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of SEC officials), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts020409-joint.htm (explaining that, as of
early 2009, there are “5,500 broker-dealers (including 173,000 branch offices and
665,000 registered representatives)” regulated by the SEC).
26
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 774.
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for the crisis was somewhat equivocal.27 That draft also considered
several prior scandals—from Enron to the mutual fund timing—
and largely exonerated the SEC from blame.28 For Enron and the
other pre-Sarbanes-Oxley accounting fraud, Coffee and Sale reasoned that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”)
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the
“AICPA”) were primarily at fault, observing that industry-adopted
accounting rules enabled Enron to mask its liabilities, leading to its
eventual demise.29 Similarly, with respect to the 2008 credit crisis,
Coffee and Sale characterized competition among investment
banks in the market for mortgage-backed investments as leading to
a “mad momentum” that was unlikely to be tempered by the threat
of SEC enforcement.30 Although they conceded that the SEC had
occasionally fallen behind other regulators—specifically the New
York State Attorney General—with respect to the analyst scandals
and mutual fund market timing, they viewed the regulatory response to these scandals less as evidence of SEC failure than of the
utility of maintaining state enforcement as a safeguard against
regulatory capture.31
In revising their original draft, Coffee and Sale’s assessment of
the SEC has changed. In particular, the authors now view the SEC
as directly responsible, although perhaps unintentionally so, for allowing the largest investment banks to increase their levels of leverage and risk to the point that, when the market turned against
them, they could not sustain their operations.32 According to Coffee and Sale, these failures were attributable to the SEC’s adoption
of the Consolidated Supervised Entities Program in 2004
27

John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea? 16 (Sep. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (“In fairness, the SEC does not deserve the primary
blame.”).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 27.
31
Id. at 17.
32
According to Professors Coffee and Sale, the SEC “probably legitimately believed
that it was gaining regulatory authority from the CSE Program (but it was wrong).”
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 737 n.80. Coffee and Sale also acknowledge that
the SEC’s failures in regulatory oversight of asset-backed securitizations “may
have
played a greater causal role in the debacle than has been generally
emphasized. . . .” Id. at 734.
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(“CSE”).33 The program was a regulatory response to competitive
pressure imposed by the European Union’s adoption of the Financial Conglomerates Directive.34 The CSE program, for the first
time, subjected the largest U.S. investment banks to comprehensive SEC oversight in the place of the prior, more limited supervision of their broker-dealer subsidiaries. The program, however,
was voluntary, and the price demanded by the investment banks
for their submission to SEC oversight was high. Specifically, the
banks demanded and received relaxation of the SEC’s traditional
net capital rules in favor of a more flexible regime modeled after
the “Basel II” standards.35
The CSE program, which has now been terminated,36 may appear to be an easy target—of the five banks that participated in the
program, three essentially collapsed and the other two reorganized
as bank holding companies.37 All five banks dramatically increased
their leverage after entry into the program, invested heavily in
subprime-related real estate assets that fell substantially in value,
and suffered unprecedented stock price declines.38 Although media
33

For a detailed description of the SEC’s decision to adopt the program, see
Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ‘04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1.
34
See id.; see also Consolidated Supervision of U.S. Securities Firms and Affiliated
Industrial Loan Corporations: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (testimony of Erik Sirri, Director, SEC Division of
Market Regulation), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ACF84F7.pdf
(providing historical perspective on adoption of the CSE program).
35
Consolidated Supervision of U.S. Securities Firms and Affiliated Industrial Loan
Corporations, supra note 34, at 4–5.
36
See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-230.htm (announcing termination of the CSE program).
37
See Associated Press, Last Big U.S. Investment Banks Change Status, Sept. 22,
2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26827357/ (reporting announcement
of decision by the last two investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, to
become bank holding companies).
38
Lehman Brothers, for example, closed at $36.72 on June 22, 2004 and subsequently traded at over $85 per share before filing for bankruptcy on September 15,
2008. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill is Sold: Failing to Find Buyer, Lehman Set to
File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1; Market Watch,
http://www.marketwatch.com/tools/quotes/historical.asp?date=6%2F22%2F2004&sy
mb=LEHMQ&siteid=mktw&x=12&y=4 (stock price for June 22, 2004) (last visited
Feb. 2, 2009). Bear Stearns, which had traded as high as $172 per share in January,
2007, was sold to J.P. Morgan Chase in March, 2008 for $10 per share. See Landon
Thomas Jr. & Eric Dash, Seeking Fast Deal, JPMorgan Quintuples Bear Stearns Bid,
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reports have faulted the program for its lax standards,39 Coffee and
Sale argue that the problem was not with the rules, but with the
SEC’s inability to monitor the investment banks’ financial exposure or to compel them to take action if the SEC identified a potential problem.40 They note the Inspector General’s finding that
Bear Stearns was in compliance with the program’s rules at all
times prior to its near-collapse and observe that the SEC was simply outgunned in its effort to oversee the operations of the large
investment banks.41 According to one source, SEC Commissioner
Paul Atkins noted that “monitoring the sophisticated models used
by the brokerages under the CSE rules—and stepping in where net
capital falls too low—‘is going to present a real management challenge’ for the SEC.”42 Similarly, the SEC’s effectiveness was limited
by the voluntary nature of the CSE program. As Chairman Cox
conceded: “[T]he CSE program was fundamentally flawed from
the beginning, because investment banks could opt in or out of supervision voluntarily. The fact that investment bank holding companies could withdraw from this voluntary supervision at their discretion diminished the perceived mandate of the CSE program,
and weakened its effectiveness.”43
These problems are peculiar to the CSE program. Thus, it is difficult to extend Coffee and Sale’s analysis to a more general assessment of the SEC. Yet even within the confines of the CSE pro-

N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2008, at C1; AOL Money & Finance, http://finance.aol.com/
quotes/deutsche-bk-ag-ldn-brh/bsc/nys/historical-prices?tf=1%2F1%2F20072%2F1%2F2007&gran=d (showing that Bear Stearns traded for $172.61 on Jan. 17,
2007) (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). In 2008, “Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley lost more than two-thirds of their market value.”
Christine Harper, Goldman Sachs Shares Morgan Stanley’s Darker
Outlook, Bloomberg.com, Dec. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601103&sid=afFOZS9odyoQ&refer=news.
39
Commentators have also questioned whether the Basel II standard was appropriate for investment banks. See, e.g., Lee A. Pickard, Viewpoints: SEC’s Old Capital
Approach Was Tried—and True, Am. Banker, Aug. 8, 2008, at 10 (arguing that SEC’s
traditional net capital rule required less judgment and oversight to implement effectively).
40
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 740.
41
Id.
42
Kevin Drawbaugh, US SEC Clears New Net-Capital Rules For Brokerages,
Reuters News, Apr. 28, 2004, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/newsarchive/2004/20040428_Headline08_Drawbaugh.htm (citing Commissioner Atkins).
43
Press Release, supra note 36 (quoting Chairman Cox).
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gram, there is evidence that the SEC’s failures were more extensive. Inspector General Kotz, in his report on Bear Stearns and the
CSE program, characterized the SEC’s administration of the CSE
program as extremely lax.44 The report faulted the SEC staff for
identifying but failing to address significant risks at Bear Stearns
such as its amount of leverage, its concentration of assets, and its
risk management processes.45 The report stated that SEC staff issued approvals before its inspection process was complete,46 did not
review filings in a timely manner,47 and allowed Bear Stearns employees to perform critical audit work in place of outside auditors.48
These failures raise serious questions about the SEC’s internal culture and monitoring, questions that extend beyond the parameters
of the CSE program and that must be answered in addressing the
agency’s future effectiveness. This issue will be considered in more
detail in Part II below.
Coffee and Sale do not conclude from their analysis of the CSE
program that the SEC is obsolete; although such a conclusion
might be inferred from their support for a super-regulator. They do
argue, however, that the SEC is not a suitable prudential regulator
for financial institutions. They reason that such regulation should
be consolidated with banking regulation and, more broadly, the
regulation of financial institutions, which might include financial
advisors and hedge funds as well as broker-dealers, investment
banks, and commercial banks.49 They argue that capital adequacy
regulation and risk management are within the core competencies
of banking regulators.50 They also allude to the superior resources
of banking regulators. In particular, they compare the Federal Reserve, which maintains an office within each regulated bank hold-

44

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of Inspector Gen., SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns
and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, at ix–xi (Report
No. 446-A, Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.rgm.com/articles/SECBearOversightReport.pdf [hereinafter SEC Inspector General Report].
45
Id. at 17–23.
46
Id. at 40–41.
47
Id. at 44–45.
48
Id. at 34–35.
49
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 774.
50
Id. at 775.
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ing company, with the SEC in which a total of thirteen individuals
staffed the office that administered the CSE program.51
C. Specific Blueprint Recommendations
The Blueprint’s recommendations for restructuring financial
regulation are extensive, and many of the proposals appear less
compelling in light of recent market developments. In particular,
the Blueprint’s emphasis on deregulation—motivated by an effort
to maintain U.S. capital market competitiveness in a global economy—must be carefully reconsidered. Such reconsideration is beyond the scope of Coffee and Sale’s article, although Coffee and
Sale expressly acknowledge that “excessive deregulation was a
principal cause of the 2008 financial crisis.”52 Rather than taking on
broader questions about the appropriate scope of financial regulation, Coffee and Sale focus on three specific Blueprint recommendations: replacing rules with principles, preempting state regulators, and increasing self regulation as a substitute for enforcement.
In the Blueprint, these recommendations are integrated as part of a
larger plan to reduce or eliminate the SEC and its distinctive regulatory mission, in the near term through a CFTC-SEC merger, and,
in the long term, by replacing the SEC with a business conduct
regulator.
1. Principles Versus Rules
It is in the context of recommending an SEC-CFTC merger that
the Blueprint recommends a shift from rules to principles. The
Blueprint advocates “moderniz[ation of] the SEC’s regulatory approach” to incorporate the CFTC’s “principles-based regulatory
philosophy.”53 Coffee and Sale do not address the CFTC’s regulatory principles specifically, since they deal with market regulation,
prudential regulation of financial institutions, and settlement and
trading practices—functions that, under Coffee and Sale’s analysis,
would fall largely outside of the SEC’s future authority. Instead,
Coffee and Sale consider rules versus standards within the context

51

Id. at 742.
Id. at 782.
53
Blueprint, supra note 6, at 11–12.
52
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of the current U.S. securities regime.54 In so doing, Coffee and Sale
incorporate an extensive and longstanding legal debate analyzing
the trade-off between rules and standards.55
Coffee and Sale demonstrate compellingly that, as applied to securities regulation (to be distinguished from accounting or regulation of financial institutions), the debate over rules versus standards offers little traction. From its inception, federal securities
regulation has incorporated a mixture of rules and principles. Public offering disclosure, the short swing trading provisions of Section
16, and the traditional broker-dealer net capital provisions are examples of the rules-based approach. Federal securities fraud under
SEC Rule 10b-5 is a principles-based regulatory approach. Coffee
and Sale accurately characterize the existing system as a hybrid in
which a combination of rules and principles attempts to achieve
both predictability and flexibility.56 Moreover, they show that, from
an industry perspective, the hybrid system is desirable.57 Although
persuasive arguments can be made in favor of shifting the approach along the rules/principles continuum with respect to a specific regulatory issue, a wide scale shift in either direction is likely
to be both unproductive and politically infeasible.
Coffee and Sale also consider the implications of a principlesbased approach in the context of an enforcement-oriented regulatory system. They criticize the Blueprint for failing to identify the
potential impact of a principles-based approach on civil liability
exposure, arguing that a principles-based approach increases litigation uncertainty and settlement pressure, placing increased strain
on a litigation system that is already controversial.58 The same argument has been extended beyond private civil liability to public
enforcement. Former SEC Chair Harvey Pitt and Karen Shapiro,
for example, criticized the SEC’s actions against insider trading as

54

Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 749.
The seminal article on this topic is Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992). In securities regulation, one of the most
comprehensive treatments is James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities
Regulation, 57 Duke L.J. 625 (2007).
56
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 718.
57
Id. at 757.
58
Id. at 757–58.
55
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“regulation by enforcement.”59 They claimed that the SEC’s ad hoc
efforts to define wrongful conduct through enforcement actions
provided targets with insufficient notice and that norms should instead be generated through rulemaking.60
2. Preemption of State Regulation
Coffee and Sale next consider the Blueprint’s recommended
preemption of state regulation. The Blueprint’s recommendation is
threefold.61 First, it advocates bringing a wide range of financial
service providers within the regulatory authority of its new business conduct regulator, the Conduct of Business Regulatory
Agency (“CBRA”).62 The Blueprint further argues that the CBRA
should adopt national standards for business conduct that “would
apply to all financial services firms, whether federally or statechartered” and “preempt[] state business conduct laws.”63 Finally,
the Blueprint articulates a narrow role for state regulators in enforcing these standards—optimally, according to the Blueprint,
state regulators could bring issues to the CBRA’s attention and, if
authorized to do so, proceed to investigate and enforce the standards.64
Coffee and Sale do not fully explore the recommendation for the
adoption of national standards.65 Instead they focus on, and defend,
the states’ role in enforcement. They note the responsiveness of
state regulators—particularly the New York Attorney General—to
59

See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities and
Exchange Commission vs. Corporate America (1982); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L.
Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7
Yale J. on Reg. 149 (1990).
60
See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 59, at 288 (warning of “possibility that enforcement
proceedings will become a substitute for formal regulation”).
61
The Blueprint is somewhat ambiguous on the precise role contemplated for state
enforcement and, in its most detailed section, offers several possible alternative state
roles in rulemaking and enforcement. See Blueprint, supra note 6, at 179–80.
62
Id. at 145. Significantly, the Blueprint identifies a fourth regulator—a corporate
finance regulator that would hold the SEC’s current responsibilities with respect to
corporate disclosures and corporate governance—but the Blueprint does not detail
the relationship among the corporate finance regulator and its other proposed regulators. Id.
63
Id. at 20.
64
Id. at 180.
65
As the Blueprint notes, existing law already preempts most state regulation of securities-related transactions. Id. at 178.
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analyst conflicts of interest, the mutual fund timing scandals, and
most recently, auction-rate securities.66 As these examples demonstrate, state regulators have served as a valuable backstop in cases
of federal regulatory failure, particularly failure in the regulation of
financial institutions. Other research documents the value of state
enforcement efforts in greater detail.67 Significantly, state regulators have often played an important role in the protection of retail
investors—a role traditionally within the core competency of the
SEC, but that has received diminished SEC attention in recent
years.68
The Blueprint does not attempt to justify its recommendation
that state enforcement activity be preempted, nor is preemption
the inevitable consequence of establishing uniform federal standards. Indeed, the recent state investigative and enforcement actions detailed by Coffee and Sale addressed conduct that violated
federal as well as state law. Oddly enough, however, Coffee and
Sale appear sympathetic to the Blueprint’s recommendation, reasoning that, theoretically, a state regulator “could take action under antifraud rules that did conflict with important federal regulatory policies.”69 As a result, they suggest an alternative to outright
preemption that would empower the SEC to invalidate state regulatory actions that conflicted with federal policy on a case-by-case
basis.70 Although Coffee and Sale’s solution is superior to complete
preemption, the recent and continuing history of securities-related
scandals and SEC failures offers little reason to cut back even
minimally on state enforcement efforts.
3. Increased Reliance on SROs
Finally, Coffee and Sale consider the Blueprint’s recommendation that increased regulatory authority be transferred from the
66

Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 713.
See, e.g., William Francis Galvin, White Paper, States’ Demonstrated Record of
Effectiveness In Their Investor Protection Efforts Underscores the Need to Avoid
Further Preemption of State Enforcement Authority (Dec. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctwhitepaper/Secretary_Galvin_Enforcement_White_
Paper.pdf (describing the role of the states in initiating enforcement actions and providing recovery to victims of substantial securities frauds over past ten years).
68
Id. at 7.
69
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 760.
70
Id. at 780.
67
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SEC to the self regulatory organizations (“SRO”). This recommendation perhaps most clearly exposes the deregulatory agenda
behind the Blueprint’s proposals, and Coffee and Sale identify
many reasons why SRO regulation cannot offer meaningful protection of investors and the markets. First, as indicated earlier, there is
the lesson of the U.K. experience in which the SRO model failed.
Significantly, a major component of the failure was the “inability or
unwillingness” of the SROs to protect investors from “fraud and
misconduct.”71 Although the SROs may have a comparative advantage in formulating rules that address back office procedures and
market infrastructure, their incentives are to serve the interests of
their constituencies—listed companies, broker-dealers, and as Coffee and Sale observe, for publicly traded SROs, their own investors.72 There is little reason to believe that the SROs would benefit
from aggressively enforcing securities regulations that did not further those constituent interests. Indeed, experience shows that the
SROs have behaved as predicted. The New York Stock Exchange,
for example, monitors potential insider trading through stock
watch, because insider trading hurts its specialists.73 With respect to
analyst disclosure provisions, where misconduct hurt investors but
not brokers, however, the SROs failed to enforce clear regulatory
directives.
Increased reliance on the SROs is also inconsistent with the
Blueprint’s primary justification for regulatory reform. The existence of multiple SROs with overlapping jurisdiction does not consolidate the regulatory functions; instead, it increases the potential
for fragmentation. At the same time, the existing SROs lack jurisdiction over many participants in the securities markets, including
investment advisors, investment companies, hedge funds, and
unlisted issuers, creating the potential for continued regulatory
gaps. Forces such as technological innovation and globalization
continue to offer market participants alternative mechanisms for
accessing capital, allowing issuers and others to exit from onerous
71

Id. at 722–23.
Id. at 772–73.
73
See, e.g., NYSE Regulation, About NYSE Regulation, Market Surveillance,
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/1045516499685.html (explaining how “[t]he
Stock Watch unit of Market Surveillance . . . detect[s] possible insider trading and
market manipulation”).
72
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SRO regulations.74 As a result, the SRO’s oversight in the future
will likely resemble the type of voluntary regulation that proved
unsuccessful in the CSE program.
Perhaps most problematic is the Blueprint’s failure to establish
that current SRO regulation works. As Coffee and Sale explain,
the SEC currently delegates primary oversight of broker-dealers to
FINRA.75 Yet few of the details of FINRA’s investigations, its disciplinary actions, and even its customer arbitrations are transparent.76 Although it issues press releases in a few high profile cases, in
most cases FINRA provides only summary statistics—maintaining
its investigations, case resolutions, and even customer complaints,
as confidential. Indeed, FINRA reporting and record-keeping provisions affirmatively facilitate the concealment of allegations of
misconduct.77
Although it is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of FINRA’s
oversight from its disclosures, there have been obvious shortcomings.78 For example, FINRA’s record in addressing research analyst
74
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at768. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and
the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1435, 1459–66 (2008) (describing technological innovations such as electronic trading, and explaining how such
innovations reduce barriers to entry into the trading markets).
75
Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 768–69.
76
See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, A Tame Regulator for the SEC, Am. Prospect, Dec. 18,
2008, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=a_tame_regulator_for_the_sec (observing that FINRA “has little transparency”).
77
See Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA Manual, Rule 2130 (Apr.
12, 2004) (allowing expungement of customer disputes upon issuance of a court order
or arbitration award); see, e.g., FINRA Can’t Tell Investors What They Most Want to
Know, http://investorswatchdog.com/blog/investorswatchblog/?p=15 (Nov. 16, 2007,
19:32) (describing expungement). FINRA adopted rule changes in 2004 to make expungement more difficult. See Lynnley Browning, Site That Tracks Brokers Questioned on Erased Cases, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2007, at C10 (describing new rules providing that arbitrators can expunge a broker’s record “only if an arbitration panel
found that an investor’s allegations had been factually impossible or false, or that the
accused broker had not been individually involved in the matter”); see also FINRA
Considers Change to Rule Regarding Sales Practice Violations by Brokers, Insurance
& Financial Advisor Webnews, Apr. 30, 2008, http://www.ifawebnews.com/
articles/2008/05/06/news/life/doc4817358786a95404744546.txt (describing FINRA reporting requirement enabling allegations of sales practice violations that do not name
a specific broker to remain “unavailable to regulators, to prospective broker-dealer
employers and to the investing public through FINRA BrokerCheck”).
78
Mary Schapiro, then-CEO of FINRA, disclaimed responsibility for failing to uncover the Madoff fraud, stating that FINRA lacked jurisdiction over investment advisors; see, e.g., Dan Jamieson, Finra Had Authority in Madoff Matter, Legal Eagles
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conflicts of interest has been criticized.79 More recently, the auction-rate securities scandal suggests the possibility of serious and
widespread oversight deficiencies. Auction-rate securities are typically long term bonds with fluctuating interest rates. The interest
rates are reset periodically by auctions that also provide liquidity
for investors.80 If investor demand for the securities at an auction is
insufficient, the interest rate is reset to a penalty rate, but the investor may not be able to liquidate its position. According to media
reports of the scandal, the leading investment banks sold billions of
dollars of these securities by representing that they were near-cash
equivalents, failing to disclose to investors the liquidity risk of a
failed auction. Moreover, the banks allegedly concealed the extent
of the liquidity risk by secretly propping up failed auctions by purchasing the securities themselves.81
Even though the auction-rate securities market existed for
twenty years, and the recent allegations suggest widespread misrepresentations, misleading sales practices, violations of suitability
requirements, and outright fraud, FINRA seemingly did not detect
the problem through its supervision of the brokers involved. Indeed, FINRA did not even address the issue until after widespread
auction failures left thousands of investors holding illiquid securi-

Say, Investment News, Jan. 25, 2009, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090125/REG/301259989 (describing Schapiro’s testimony to Senate Banking Committee). Critics have disputed this claim, arguing that
FINRA’s review of the broker-dealer’s records should have revealed the fraud. See
id. (describing dispute over FINRA’s oversight role). More recently, FINRA has been
criticized for missing a massive fraud allegedly spanning more than a decade at the
Stanford Group. Jesse Westbrook & Ian Katz, Finra’s Stanford Probe Raises Questions on Oversight, Bloomberg.com, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ahaUscXNr5wY&refer=home. Despite having uncovered regulatory violations at Stanford through the exercise of its inspection authority,
FINRA failed to detect the scope of the fraud and merely imposed a $10,000 fine. Id.
79
Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 1035, 1043–45 (2003) (reporting findings that
NYSE and NASD failed to enforce rules governing analyst conflicts of interest effectively).
80
See, e.g., Stephanie Lee, Auction-Rate Securities: Bidder’s Remorse?, 4 Pratt’s J.
Bankr. L. 585 (2008) (explaining financial structure of auction-rate securities).
81
Liz Rappaport & Randall Smith, UBS to Pay $19 Billion As Auction Mess Hits
Wall Street, Wall St. J., Aug. 9–10, 2008, at A1. The Journal reported that UBS may
have submitted bids in almost 70% of its auctions between January 2006 and February 2008. Id.
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ties.82 Even then, FINRA initiated a “fact-finding sweep” rather
than an enforcement action.83 In contrast, New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo launched an industry probe into auction-rate securities in April 2008 that included issuing subpoenas to
eighteen Wall Street firms.84 The efforts of Cuomo and other state
regulators were subsequently coordinated with the SEC and
FINRA and recovered billions of dollars for investors.85
FINRA also maintains a dispute resolution system that, under
the Blueprint’s approach, would likely displace most private investor litigation.86 The FINRA arbitration system is currently the exclusive method of resolving virtually all broker-customer disputes,
from suitability to wrongful execution to fraud. For years, critics
have charged that the system is biased in favor of the industry, yet
FINRA has failed to provide sufficient transparency to test this
claim empirically.87 The SEC, charged with protecting investors,
82

Lynn Hume & Andrew Ackerman, SEC, FINRA Probing ARS Sales: Misrepresentations of Risk Alleged, Bond Buyer, Apr. 11, 2008, at 1 (stating that FINRA’s
probes began over the past two weeks in response to hundreds of investor complaints). But cf. Testimony Concerning Auction Rate Securities Markets: Before the
H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (testimony of Susan Merrill,
FINRA Chief of Enforcement), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
hearing110/merrill091808.pdf (describing FINRA information gathering as consisting
of a survey of two hundred firms in late February, followed by a sweep letter to two
dozen firms in early spring).
83
Hume & Ackerman, supra note 82, at 2.
84
Vikas Bajaj, Inquiries Into Auction-Rate Securities Widen, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18,
2008, at C6.
85
See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General
Cuomo Announces Settlements with Bank of America and Royal Bank of Canada to
Recover Billions for Investors in Auction-Rate Securities (Oct. 8, 2008),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/oct/oct8a_08.html (reporting recovery
of $51 billion as of Oct. 8, 2008).
86
Indeed, some have advocated displacing securities fraud class actions with arbitrations. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1055, 1060–62 (1999) (proposing extending arbitration to most private securities
fraud claims).
87
See, e.g., Jill Gross & Barbara Black, Report to the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical
Study (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/478 (empirically studying investor perceptions of fairness in arbitration process); Gretchen
Morgenson, Is This Game Already Over?: Critics Say Arbitration Panels Often Have
Hidden Conflicts, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2006, § 3 (Sunday Business), at 1 (reporting
criticisms of arbitration process including industry domination, arbitrator bias, and
inadequately disclosed conflicts of interest).
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has made little effort to determine the adequacy of FINRA arbitration as a remedy for broker misconduct.
II. HAS THE SEC FAILED TO REGULATE EFFECTIVELY?
For the most part, Coffee and Sale’s article is appropriately
skeptical of the Blueprint’s recommendations. The credit crisis,
however, makes the evaluation of the SEC far more compelling.
Ultimately, Coffee and Sale’s article just is not tough enough, although Professor Coffee has concededly addressed other aspects of
the SEC’s failures elsewhere.88 If the SEC has failed to regulate effectively, the CSE program, which dealt with just five companies—
albeit five very economically significant companies—is just a piece
of the story.
The absence of SEC leadership throughout the financial crisis is
perhaps the most significant aspect of the failure. For decades the
SEC has been known as the top cop on Wall Street, yet, when the
crisis hit, members of the Commission remained silent. The Wall
Street Journal excoriated Chairman Cox for his lack of involvement
in the emergency forced sale of Bear Stearns,89 and while its criticisms may have been excessive, the fact remains that the SEC
showed limited responsiveness.90
Virtually the only publicly visible action taken by the SEC as the
crisis unfolded was the adoption of several restrictions on short
selling. In July, 2008, the SEC announced an immediate emergency
88
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Commentary: Where was the SEC?, CNNPolitics.com, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/12/16/coffee.madoff/
(stating that “considerable evidence suggests [the SEC] was asleep at the switch” with
respect to the Madoff fraud).
89
Kara Scannell & Susanne Craig, SEC Chief Under Fire as Fed Seeks Bigger Wall
Street Role: Cox Draws Criticism for Low-Key Leadership During Bear Crisis, Wall.
St. J., June 23, 2008, at A1.
90
For a comprehensive list of SEC actions taken in response to the credit crisis, see
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Actions During Turmoil in Credit Markets, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/sec-actions.htm (listing actions taken). In addition, at
least with respect to its oversight of Bear Stearns, the SEC apparently attempted to
cover up the Inspector General’s findings of misconduct. Bloomberg News reported
that, pursuant to requests from the SEC Office of Trading and Markets, the Inspector
General deleted extensive material from his report before it was released to the public. See Mark Pittman, Elliot Blair Smith & Jesse Westbrook, Cox’s SEC Censors Report on Bear Stearns Collapse, Bloomberg.net, Oct. 7, 2008, http://www.rgm.com/
articles/bloomberg11.html (describing deletion of 136 references).
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order banning short selling in the stock of nineteen financial
firms.91 The ban lasted approximately three weeks.92 Subsequently,
the SEC expanded its restrictions; on September 19, 2008, it announced a temporary ban on selling short the stock of 799 financial
companies.93 Finally, the SEC adopted non temporary rules that
require large traders to disclose their short selling.94 The SEC
touted its actions as addressing “market manipulation that threatens investors and capital markets.”95 In adopting the September 19
ban, Chairman Cox explained that “[t]he emergency order temporarily banning short selling of financial stocks will restore equilibrium to markets.”96 Instead, from September 19, 2008, to October
9, 2008, stock prices fell by approximately 25%.97 Indeed, in December 2008, Cox described the short selling ban as “the biggest
mistake of his tenure.”98
Empirical scholars are still assessing the precise effects of the
bans, but early evidence suggests that they did not achieve the desired objectives. According to the studies, the bans were not warranted by excessive short selling activity, and short selling did not
91

Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act
Release No. 58,166, [2008 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,247 (July
15, 2008).
92
See Marcy Gordon, SEC’s Ban on Short-Selling Fannie, Freddie Ends, USA Today, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/2008-08-12-sec-shortselling-ban_N.htm (describing ban as lasting from July 21, 2008 through August 12,
2008).
93
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks
to Protect Investors and Markets (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-211.htm. The initial duration of the ban was ten business days. Id.
Both the duration of the ban and the number of issuers covered were subsequently
increased.
94
Order Amending and Extending Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to
Market Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,724, [2008 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,292 (Oct. 2, 2008).
95
Press Release, supra note 93 (quoting Chairman Cox).
96
Id.
97
The adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average fell from an adjusted closing price of
11,388.44 on September 19, 2008, to 8,579.19 on October 9, 2008. Yahoo! Finance,
Dow Jones Industrial Average Historical Prices, http://finance.yahoo.com/
q/hp?s=^DJI (enter September 19, 2008, as start date and October 9, 2008, as end
date).
98
Amit R. Paley & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Chief Defends His Restraint, Wash.
Post, Dec. 24, 2008, at A1 (quoting interview with Chairman Cox).
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contribute materially to stock price declines. At the same time,
stocks that were subject to the bans suffered increased volatility,
lower prices, and dramatically reduced liquidity.99 In one of the
most comprehensive studies to date, Arturo Bris examined the effect of the July 2008 emergency order.100 Bris found that the order
reduced both liquidity and market efficiency. In addition, the nineteen stocks subject to the ban experienced ten percent worse performance than other U.S. financial stocks.101 A quick study of the
September ban by NASDAQ chief economist Frank Hatheway
found that liquidity of the stocks subject to the ban was “about half
what it was before the ban—a far greater evaporation of market
depth than occurred with other stocks.”102
The short selling bans were a response to deteriorating market
conditions. More problematic were the SEC’s activities in the
months preceding the crash. An example is the SEC’s ongoing consideration of the move to international financial accounting standards (“IFRS”). The SEC engaged in a multi-year project in which
it repeatedly promised to allow U.S. companies to use IFRS instead of GAAP.103 The market crisis likely delayed this move, but
more important, it called into question the justifications for the
move.104 IFRS offers issuers greater discretion with respect to fi99

Arturo Bris, Short Selling Activity in Financial Stocks and the SEC July 15th
Emergency Order (Working Paper Dated Aug. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.arturobris.com/eo/brisreportAug12.pdf. But see Ian W. Marsh & Norman
Niemer, The Impact of Short Sales Restrictions (Working Paper Dated Nov. 30,
2008), available at http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/media/stories/resources/the-impact-ofshort-sales-restrictions.pdf (studying short selling bans introduced by seventeen countries and finding little impact in terms of either returns or efficiency).
100
Bris, supra note 99.
101
Id.
102
David Greising, Short-Selling Ban Leaves SEC with Little to Show, Chi. Trib.,
Oct. 10, 2008, at 37 (reporting results of Hatheway study).
103
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Takes Action to Improve Consistency
of Disclosure to U.S. Investors in Foreign Companies (Nov. 15, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-235.htm.
104
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements
Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S.
Issuers (proposed rule which would require domestic issuers to convert to IFRS by
2014); Rules and Related Matters: SEC Publishes Proposed IFRS “Roadmap,” SEC
News Digest, Issue 2008–223 (Nov. 18, 2008). In November 2008, the SEC released a
roadmap under which domestic issuers would be required to convert to IFRS by 2014.
See Marie Leone, SEC Chief Accountant Plans His Exit, CFO.com, Nov. 25, 2008,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12673473.
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nancial reporting, thus reducing financial statement transparency.
This objective appears far more problematic in an environment
characterized by widespread mistrust of accounting numbers. As
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) member Charles Niemeier has warned, IFRS might undermine U.S.
regulation of financial reporting by introducing a system that is
more difficult to enforce.105 Thus, in addition to reducing transparency, IFRS would be deregulatory.
If IFRS threatens to reduce financial transparency, so does the
effort to suspend fair value accounting. Fair value accounting requires firms to report the current or fair value of their assets rather
than historical price. In most cases, this requires firms to mark their
assets to market.106 The SEC has advocated fair value accounting
since as early as 2000—before the spectacular collapse of Enron.107
In recent months, however, the fair value mandate has come under
vigorous attack. Financial firms have struggled with the application
of accounting rules to value troubled assets in volatile markets. In
some cases, lack of marketability has required firms to report substantially reduced values.
These problems led to extensive political efforts to relieve the
mandate and to allow firms greater discretion in valuing troubled
assets such as collateralized mortgage obligations and credit default swaps. Defenders of fair value accounting argue that it must
be retained in order to enable a return of trust to the markets.108
105

Marie Leone, Regulator Rips into Global Accounting Plan, CFO.com, Sept. 10,
2008, http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/12202211/c_12207327?f=options (quoting Charles Niemeier as stating that “[t]he rush to adopt international accounting
standards is a politically motivated, myth-ridden effort that will weaken U.S. capital
markets”).
106
Exchange price is defined as “the price in an orderly transaction between market
participants.” Financial Accounting Standards Board, Fair Value Measurements,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 157, at 2 (Sept. 2006).
107
Jackson M. Day, Deputy Chief Accountant, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fair Value
Accounting—Let’s Work Together and Get It Done!, Remarks at 28th Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments (Dec. 5, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch436.htm (explaining that “[a]ll financial instruments should be measured at fair value [and] [t]hose measurements should be reliable
and transparent”).
108
The joint statement of the Center for Audit Quality, the Council of Institutional
Investors, and the CFA Institute issued on October 1, 2008, strongly opposes any suspension of fair value accounting, noting that it “would deprive investors of critical financial information when it is needed most.” Joint Statement of the Center for Audit
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Ensuring appropriate financial transparency is at the core of the
SEC’s traditional expertise and, in fact, the Emergency Economy
Stabilization Act of 2008 responded to the lobbying efforts of
banks and others by authorizing the SEC to suspend fair value accounting as necessary.109 Although it does not currently appear that
the SEC will suspend fair value accounting, the Commission has
110
done little to stem the controversy. At a minimum, the SEC
could explain to critics that mark-to-market, like short selling, is an
inappropriate fall-guy.111 Under the current rules, banks mark a
small percentage of their assets to market—most assets are carried
at historical cost.112 Moreover, the market has clearly shown that it
does not believe currently reported valuations.113 The SEC’s failure
to respond and the possibility that accounting rules could be modified in response to political pressure continue to threaten public
confidence.114
The SEC’s involvement in IFRS and fair value accounting contrasts with its spotty record on perhaps the most critical accounting
issue of the credit crisis: derivatives regulation. Despite the enormous risks posed by derivatives, both to the viability of major U.S.
Quality, the Council of Institutional Investors, and CFA Institute Opposing Suspension
of
Mark-to-Market
Accounting,
Oct.
1,
2008,
available
at
http://www.cfainstitute.org/aboutus/press/release/08releases/20081001_01.html.
109
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (2008). Section 132 of the Act grants the SEC authority to suspend fair value accounting for any issuer or with respect to any class or category of transaction.
110
Indeed, shortly before this article went to press, FASB relaxed mark-to-market accounting rules. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera, Don't Eat Wall Street's Big Fudge - it's
a Dog's Breakfast, Fin. Times, Apr. 4, 2009, at 15 (describing FASB’s rule change).
Media reports attributed the move to political pressure; as the Financial Times stated:
“A few choice words from politicians was all it took for the fearless members of the
accounting watchdog to turn from staunch defenders of ‘fair value’ to advocates of the
more ‘flexible’ approach so beloved by banks . . . .” Id.
111
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Does TARP Point to Suspension of Mark-to-Market?,
Industry Overview, Oct. 24, 2008 (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association)
(describing mark to market accounting as a “red herring” and stating that “the problem is just plain old bad loans, in massive amounts”).
112
See David Reilly, Going on Offense With Mark-to-Market, Wall St. J., Dec. 19,
2008, at C10 (explaining that, of 17 banks seized by the FDIC this year, only ten percent of their average total assets were marked to market).
113
Id. (citing RiskMetrics Group study finding that “59% of publicly traded bankholding companies trade below their third-quarter net worth, or book value”).
114
Marine Cole, Bailout Offers Fair-Value Out, Fin. Wk., Oct. 5, 2008,
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081005/REG/810039953.
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public issuers and to the transparency of their financial statements,
the SEC yielded to industry and political claims that derivatives
trading did not require regulatory oversight.115 In the Shad-Johnson
Accord, the chairmen of the SEC and the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) resolved a jurisdictional dispute
over derivatives regulation by agreeing that the SEC would retain
jurisdiction only over securities and options on securities.116 Most
other derivative products, including credit default swaps (“CDS”)
and futures contracts, would be regulated by the CFTC.117 The
CFTC proceeded to exempt a variety of products from regulation
and these exemptions were expanded by the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000,118 which exempted most over-thecounter derivatives trading from both securities and commodities
regulation.119 Rather than anticipating the risks associated with the
115
The risks associated with derivatives received widespread public attention in
1994, when Gibson Greetings and Proctor and Gamble suffered highly publicized
losses from derivatives trading. See, e.g., Int’l Fin. Risk Inst., Risk Mitigation Overview: Sales Practices, http://riskinstitute.ch/134730.htm (describing “seachange” in
regulatory attention to derivatives occurring in 1994). Policymakers considered several regulatory reforms aimed at addressing the potential risks, but the reforms were
not adopted. See Christopher L. Culp & Robert J. Mackay, Regulating Derivatives:
The Current System and Proposed Changes, 17 Reg. 38, 42–50 (1994) (describing reform proposals).
116
CFTC and SEC Jurisdictional Agreement: Proposed Legislation, Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982). The Shad-Johnson Accord was codified in the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (2006) (§ 2 of the Securities
Act of 1933) and 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2006) (§ 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
(1983) and in the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294
(1983).
117
Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) (codified at
various sections of 7 U.S.C.).
118
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5),
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27 (2006)). The CFMA was
adopted in response to a recommendation by a joint Treasury, CFTC, Federal Reserve, and SEC working group, which determined that increased regulation of derivatives was unnecessary. President’s Working Group on Fin. Mkts., Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act 15–23 (Nov. 1999), available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/otcact.pdf.
119
The exemption was limited to transactions involving institutions or sophisticated
individual investors. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 Brook. J. Int’l L. 319, 369 (2003) (describing this exemption as the
“Enron [A]mendment”). The CFMA also amended the federal securities laws to provide explicitly that swap agreements, including security-based swap agreements, are
not “securities.” Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
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growth of credit derivatives or espousing conservatism until those
risks could be assessed, the SEC joined in the effort to create the
regulatory gap that it now appears to regret.120 As Chairman Cox
testified before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs in September 2008, “[t]he $58 trillion notional market in credit default swaps—double the amount that was outstanding in 2006—is regulated by no one. Neither the SEC nor any
regulator has authority over the CDS market, even to require minimum disclosure to the market.”121
The SEC does not deserve exclusive blame for its failure to identify the risks associated with derivatives. Well-respected commentators claimed for years that derivatives posed no risks warranting
increased regulatory oversight.122 Moreover, the SEC did make an
effort to improve the transparency of derivatives transactions by
adopting targeted disclosure requirements. In 1997, over many
commentators’ objections,123 the SEC promulgated Item 305 to
Regulation S-K, the so-called “Market Risk Rule,”124 which singled
out derivatives for special risk disclosure in corporate financial
statements.125 Item 305 requires public companies to disclose the

§ 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1(a), 78c-1(a)
(2006)).
120
Ironically, the lone critic of the deregulatory approach was then-CFTC chair
Brooksley Born. See Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima & Jill Drew, What Went
Wrong, Wash. Post, Oct. 15, 2008, at A1 (describing Born’s unsuccessful efforts to increase regulation of derivatives in 1998).
121
Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 6 (Sept. 23, 2008)
(testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
122
For example, Nobel prize winner Merton Miller stated: “[N]o serious danger of a
derivatives-induced financial collapse really exists.” Merton H. Miller, Do We Really
Need More Regulation of Financial Derivatives?, Address at the Inauguration of the
International Executive M.B.A. Program at Barcelona Conducted by the University
of Chicago Graduate School of Business (Oct. 17, 1994) (published as Selected Paper
Number
75,
Univ.
Chi.
Graduate
Sch.
Bus.),
available
at
http://www.chicagogsb.edu/faculty/selectedpapers/sp75.pdf.
123
See, e.g., Martin H. Dozier, Note, Barings’s Ghost: Item 305 in SEC Regulation
S-K and “Market Risk” Disclosures of Financial Derivatives, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1417
(2000) (criticizing Item 305).
124
17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (2008).
125
See Dozier, supra note 123, at 1447–51 (describing circumstances leading to the
SEC’s adoption of the Market Risk Rule).
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risks associated with their derivatives positions in the Management
Discussion and Analysis section of their financial statements.126
It is unclear why the SEC’s disclosure efforts failed to maintain
investor confidence in the transparency of the financial statements
issued by the financial institutions that maintained large positions
in derivatives.127 Perhaps, as Professor Schwarcz has argued, disclosure requirements are an ineffective regulatory response to complex financial instruments.128 Perhaps the disclosure requirements
were insufficiently stringent. And perhaps the critical response to
its rules led SEC officials to undertake equivocal enforcement efforts that failed to render the disclosure requirements effective.129
Enforcement of disclosure requirements is a critical component
of the SEC’s mission,130 and recent events reveal substantial failures
in this area as well. The most dramatic example is the SEC’s failure
to detect the massive fraud at Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, LLC. Madoff’s investment business apparently operated as a
massive Ponzi scheme for more than a decade, ultimately causing
investors to lose as much as $50 billion.131 SEC Chairman Cox ad-

126

Id. at 1450–51 (describing the scope of disclosure requirements).
The markets continue to reflect a distrust of publicly reported valuation numbers.
See, e.g., Jonathan Weil, Wachovia Shows Why No Bank’s Books Are Trusted,
Bloomberg.com,
Oct.
30,
2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601039&refer=columnist_weil&sid=aZE9yF3JayDA (describing the
Wachovia board’s approval of the company’s sale to Wells Fargo for $14.8 billion despite its reported asset value of $50 billion).
128
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 10–11 (2004) (questioning the effectiveness of disclosure
requirements as a response to financial complexity).
129
The SEC administered the Market Risk Rule with a strikingly “light touch.” See,
e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Sample Letter Sent to Public Companies That Have Identified Investments in Structured Investment Vehicles, Conduits or Collateralized
Debt
Obligations
(Off-balance
Sheet
Entities)
(Dec.
2007),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfoffbalanceltr1207.htm (providing a
sample letter sent by the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance to issuers involved
with SIVs and CDOs that did not impose any mandates but merely “highlight[ed]
some of the disclosure issues that [they] may want to consider” in preparing their upcoming securities filings).
130
See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 253, 265–86
(2007) (describing the regulatory effort and enforcement intensity of the SEC).
131
According to the SEC’s complaint, Madoff’s business had been insolvent for
years and had been paying returns to some investors out of the principal invested by
other investors. Complaint at 6, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Madoff, No. 08-10791
127
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mitted that the SEC had received “[c]redible and specific allegations regarding Madoff’s financial wrongdoing going back to at
least 1999.”132 The SEC investigated Madoff’s operations in 2006
and found that Madoff misled SEC staff and withheld documents.133
Unlike Martha Stewart, however, who was sent to jail for lying to
federal investigators, Madoff was not sanctioned, and the SEC
closed the case, concluding that Madoff’s digressions were not serious enough to warrant an enforcement action.134 Some commentators have attributed the SEC’s regulatory failures to the unwillingness of SEC staff to be sufficiently vigilant in dealings with
“prominent Wall Street insiders.”135 Others blame demoralization
of the staff of an agency that is more concerned with deregulation
than with active oversight.136
The Madoff case may not be an isolated example of regulatory
failure. In addition to his report on the SEC’s supervision of Bear
Stearns under the CSE Program, SEC Inspector General Kotz released a second report stating that in 2005, two years before problems began to surface at Bear Stearns, the SEC’s Miami office
found that Bear Stearns employees had improperly inflated the
value of certain mortgage-related securities.137 It is worth noting

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
2008/comp-madoff121108.pdf.
132
Congress Plans, supra note 7. Cox placed responsibility on SEC staff, claiming
that they failed to follow up appropriately. Id.
133
Gregory Zuckerman & Kara Scannell, Madoff Misled SEC in ‘06,
Got Off, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122956182184616625.html?mod=djemalertNEWS.
134
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Enforcement, Case Closing Recommendation,
Case No. NY-07563 (Nov. 21, 2007), available at http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/Madoff_SECRecommend_20081217.pdf.
135
Congress Plans, supra note 7 (quoting Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee,
Jr.). Bernard Madoff was a powerful and influential member of the securities industry
since the 1960s. “He was board chairman of the Nasdaq Stock Market; was on the
board of governors of the NASD; sat on an advisory committee for the Securities and
Exchange Commission; and was chairman of the trading committee of Sifma, formerly the Securities Industry Association.” Susan Antilla, Madoff’s Country Clubbers
Smiled $50 Billion Ago, Bloomberg.com, Dec. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=email_en&refer==columnist_antilla&sid==ajTlcTh7XnYA.
136
Congress Plans, supra note 7 (quoting Fordham Law Professor Steven Thel).
137
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of Inspector Gen., Case No. OIG-483, Failure to
Vigorously Enforce Action Against W. Holding and Bear Stearns at the Miami Regional
Office
2–3,
13–14,
17–21
(Sept.
30,
2008),
available
at
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that the failure to value mortgage-related securities properly eventually led to Bear Stearns’s demise. Despite the firm’s willingness
to pay a $500,000 penalty for failure to supervise certain employees, the SEC staff abruptly dropped the investigation without even
presenting the matter to the Commissioners.138
Kotz also released a report criticizing an SEC investigation of
possible insider trading at Pequot Capital Management, a hedge
fund.139 The report recommended that three SEC officials be disciplined in connection with their handling of the investigation and
accused the officials of, among other things, improperly disclosing
details of the investigation to John Mack, then-CEO of Morgan
Stanley.140 The concerns in the report were seconded by members
of Congress. On October 21, 2008, Senator Charles Grassley wrote
to Chairman Cox asking him to investigate new allegations of favoritism and misconduct by senior SEC enforcement division officials.141 The SEC responded to the call for disciplinary action by referring the matter to an SEC administrative law judge, who
reviewed the records of the investigation and determined that they
did not justify sanctioning the SEC officials involved.142 The matter
has not been laid to rest, however. According to the New York
Times, the administrative law judge did not review the report in an
official capacity, but rather in an individual capacity, responding to
a request by the SEC’s executive director.143 Furthermore, new evidence has surfaced that Pequot Capital Management began making secret payments to a key witness in the case just after members

http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2008/10/14/20/Report_of_Investigation.source.
prod_affiliate.56.pdf [hereinafter Bear Stearns Report].
138
Id. at 4; Kara Scannell, SEC Watchdog Faults Agency in a Bear Case, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 11–12, 2008, at B6.
139
Aguirre Report, supra note 5, at 15–16, 188–99.
140
Id. at 187–91.
141
Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Fin., to Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg102108.pdf.
142
Walt Bogdanich, S.E.C. Judge Finds Agency Didn’t Mishandle Hedge Fund Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2008, at B3; see also Neil Roland, Judge’s Ruling Settles
SEC Leak Squabble, Fin. Wk., Nov. 16, 2008, http://www.financialweek.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081116/REG/311179978/1039/TOC (describing SEC review of allegations).
143
Bogdanich, supra note 142, at B3.
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of the Senate requested further investigation by the SEC.144 In response to this new evidence, the SEC reopened the investigation.145
The details of the SEC’s investigations and the underlying conduct at issue in these cases continue to be uncovered, and it is too
early to condemn the agency’s actions. Yet, at the moment, one
significant question is the extent to which major frauds like Madoff’s remain in existence, undetected or unaddressed by the SEC
and its staff. The market’s confidence has been shaken, not just by
revelations of fraud, but by uncertainty about the extent of fraud
that remains undetected and by concerns that the “top cop” has
been asleep at the switch.
A final area of concern is the SEC’s oversight of the credit rating
agencies. Many commentators have criticized the rating agencies
for their role in evaluating the complex mortgage-backed instruments that led to the credit crisis, although those criticisms are too
extensive to detail here.146 Whether the rating agencies engaged in
self-dealing or were simply incompetent, there is little question
that they failed to investigate the securities thoroughly and issued
ratings that were, at best, highly inflated. The rating agencies are
subject to SEC oversight under the Credit Agency Reform Act of
2006,147 which was adopted in response to the rating agencies’ failure to downgrade Enron until four days before it declared bank144
Amit R. Paley, New Evidence Emerges in Closed Insider-Trading Case, Wash.
Post, Dec. 12, 2008, at D1.
145
Kara
Scannell,
SEC
Reopens
Probe
of
Trading
at
Pequot,
Wall
St.
J.,
Jan.
7,
2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123138635480363647.html?mod=todays_europe_money_and_investing. The SEC’s
Director of Enforcement subsequently resigned. See Gretchen Morgenson, Top Enforcer at the S.E.C. Steps Down, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/business/10sec.html?ref=business (reporting resignation of Linda Chatman Thomsen amid criticisms of the Enforcement Division’s
performance).
146
See, e.g., President’s Working Group on Fin. Mkts., Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments 1 (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf (identifying flaws in
credit rating agency assessments of subprime mortgage-backed securities and other
structured products as one of the “principal underlying causes of the turmoil in financial markets”); Technical Comm. of the Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Consultation Report: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Markets 2 (Mar.
2008), available at http://www.tsi-gmbh.de/fileadmin/tsi_downloads/ABS_Research/
Materialien_zur_aktuellen_Finanzmarktdebatte/IOSCO-Ratingagenturen.pdf
(“CRAs and their ratings played a critical role in the recent market turmoil.”).
147
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327.
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ruptcy.148 Under rules adopted by the SEC in September 2007, rating agencies are required to register with the SEC as nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations (“NRSRO”)149 and to
comply with various SEC disclosure and policy rules.150 The
NRSRO designation has significant consequences in terms of the
market for the agencies’ ratings: many institutional investors may
legally invest only in instruments that receive certain NRSRO ratings.151
Although the SEC’s oversight of the credit rating agencies did
not begin until relatively late in the subprime saga, it responded to
its regulatory mandate by conducting a ten-month examination of
the rating agencies that concluded in July 2008. At this point, the
SEC issued a scathing, albeit redacted, report criticizing the agencies for conflicts of interest, poor internal auditing, and noncompliance with disclosure requirements.152 The report documented email correspondence revealing widespread disregard for the risks
of the instruments that were being rated. As the Wall Street Journal
reported after reviewing an unredacted version of the report, analysts at Standard & Poor’s viewed it as their job to give a rating to
every deal, no matter how bad.153 Seemingly, however, like Mad148
For a description of rating agency failures with respect to Enron, see Claire A.
Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1145,
1149 (2003).
149
As of September 2008, there were ten NRSROs. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/answers/
nrsro.htm, last updated Sept. 25, 2008. The three largest—Moody’s, Standard &
Poor’s, and Fitch—have a market share of over 95%. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Annual
Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations: As Required by
Section 6 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 35 (June 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency/nrsroannrep0608.pdf.
150
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1 to
-6 (2008).
151
See, e.g., John P. Hunt, The SEC’s Proposed Rating Agency Rules: Unresolved
Conflicts 1 (June 28, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1284709 (describing
the importance of rating by NRSRO).
152
Marie Leone, Subprime Slam: SEC Exposes Rating Agency Faults, CFO.com,
July 8, 2008, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/11699984 (“In its report following a 10month probe—citing several damning E-mails—the regulator says rating agencies suffer from conflicts of interest, deficient internal auditing, and poor disclosure policies.”).
153
Aaron Lucchetti, S&P Email: “We Should Not Be Rating It,” Wall St. J., Aug. 2–
3, 2008, at B1 (reporting an internal Standard & Poor’s e-mail stating that a deal
“could be structured by cows and we would rate it”).
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off’s actions, none of these problems was deemed sufficiently serious to warrant enforcement action. To date, the SEC does not appear to have filed any enforcement actions against the credit rating
agencies or their employees.154
The SEC did adopt new rules to address the problems identified
in its report. The rules require greater disclosure by the rating
agencies of both conflicts of interest and the performance of the
bonds they rate.155 Commentators have reacted negatively to the
rules, however, stating that they will do little to address conflicts of
interest.156 Notably, the SEC failed to adopt the two most significant reforms under consideration: a rule that would have created
different ratings for bonds and for structured products, and a rule
that would have reduced reliance upon the ratings by mutual funds
and other institutions.157
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS
It is easy with the benefit of hindsight to find fault with many of
the SEC’s recent actions. The Blueprint identified regulatory consolidation and deregulation as the means to enhance the United
States’ ability to attract capital, investment banking business, and
financial services in the wake of increasing global competitiveness.
The subsequent market turmoil and continued revelation of scandals and market failures suggest that deregulation and consolidation may not be the best way to enhance U.S. competitiveness. Indeed, the credit crisis and the preceding discussion suggest that
recent regulatory failures were precipitated by a lack of enforcement and financial transparency. Investment, governance, and operational decisions were all tainted by the inability of decision-

154
The Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, one of the state regulators
that the Blueprint is seeking to preempt, is investigating the rating agencies for antitrust violations. Alan Rappeport, Connecticut Goes After Ratings Agencies,
CFO.com, Oct. 26, 2007, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10047962.
155
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Measures to Strengthen
Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-284.htm.
156
Neil Roland, SEC’s Long-Anticipated Crackdown on Bond Raters a Dud, Say
Critics,
Fin.
Wk.,
Dec.
5,
2008,
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081205/REG/812059957.
157
Id.
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makers to evaluate complex financial transactions.158 At its core,
market discipline is impeded by the inability of market actors to
evaluate the financial status and performance of public companies.
The SEC has gradually reduced its emphasis on transparency.159
In part, the move appears to reflect a perception that market developments have reduced the need for mandated disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is costly, we are told, and institutional investors
can protect themselves by contract.160 The SEC responded by expanding the exemptions from traditional disclosure requirements
that are available for financial products sold to sophisticated investors.161 SEC Rule 144A is an example of this type of exemption,162 as
is the deregulation of over-the-counter derivatives described in
Part II above.163

158
The relationship of financial transparency to governance decisions was first identified by Louis Lowenstein. Louis Lowenstein, Essay, Financial Transparency and
Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1335,
1342–45 (1996).
159
See Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Staff: The Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm (describing growth of institution-only markets and asset classes that do not involve disclosure or regulatory
oversight other than anti-fraud remedies).
160
See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in
the New Millennium, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 339, 352 (2008) (explaining
that institutionalization creates an opportunity for deregulation in which the unnecessary transaction costs of compliance with the federal securities laws can be replaced
with private bargaining); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge
Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 975,
991 (2006) (stating that “the notion that investors who can ‘fend for themselves’ do
not need SEC protection is an animating principle of securities regulation that helps
demarcate the appropriate boundary of SEC regulation across the federal securities
laws”).
161
Retail investors are told to protect themselves by diversifying, by investing
through skilled intermediaries, or perhaps by staying out of the market altogether.
See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal,
88 Cal. L. Rev. 279, 310 (2000) (proposing a requirement that investors be licensed
before being allowed to engage in securities transactions); Felix Salmon, Stop Selling
Bonds to Retail Investors, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 837 (2004) (arguing that retail investors
should not be permitted to invest in sovereign bonds).
162
See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 28–30 (describing the development of the
Rule 144A market).
163
See Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor—Jungle Predator or
Shorn Lamb?, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 345, 354–55 (1995) (summarizing deregulatory responses to demands of institutional investors).
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Whether these decisions reflect agency capture or simply misjudgment, recent events suggest that even sophisticated institutional investors require greater regulatory protection. The largest
investment banks failed both to assess the risks of their collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) investments properly and to manage
those risks through hedging or diversification. The investors in
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme included hedge funds, wealthy individuals,
and large institutional investors. Professor Calomiris suggests that
pension fund investors actually fueled the decline in ratings quality
by knowingly demanding overpriced securities.164 These failures are
passed through to the institutional intermediaries’ beneficial owners.
The credit crisis is likely to result in an increased emphasis on
transparency and enforcement, at least in the short term.165 This
emphasis is perhaps the strongest argument for retaining the SEC
in one form or another. Whatever its flaws, the SEC’s expertise in
mandating and enforcing disclosure gives it an advantage over alternative regulators. By way of comparison, for example, the Federal Reserve166 had direct statutory authority to protect mortgage
customers under the Truth in Lending Act,167 yet its disclosure

164

Charles W. Calomiris, The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, and
What’s Next 27–28 (Oct. 2, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20081002_TheSubprimeTurmoil.pdf ) (“I doubt that rating
agencies were deceiving sophisticated institutional investors about the risks of the
products they were rating; rather they were transparently understating risk and inflating the grading scale of their debt ratings for securitized products so that institutional
investors (who are constrained by various regulations to invest in debts rated highly
by NRSROs) would be able to invest as they liked without being bound by the constraints of regulation or the best interests of their clients.”).
165
See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to Practising Law Institute’s “SEC Speaks in 2009” Program (Feb. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609mls.htm (announcement by newly
appointed SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro of renewed emphasis on enforcement). Professor Fox suggests that an additional justification for improving transparency is that
it is likely to improve corporate governance and lead to better operational decisions.
Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 16–19, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115361).
166
Professors Coffee and Sale argue that the Federal Reserve is superior to the SEC,
at least with respect to prudential financial regulation. Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at
775–78.
167
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006) (establishing statutory goal of customer protection);
Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 Harv.
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mandates were laughable when analyzed according to the SEC’s
concededly imperfect disclosure standards.168 The Federal Reserve
had broad authority under the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act to prevent unfair and deceptive acts and practices
in the mortgage industry,169 yet it failed to use this authority to safeguard investors from the distorted incentives and conflicts of interest of mortgage brokers.170 Similarly, until quite recently, the Federal Reserve allowed credit card issuers to engage in a variety of
unfair and deceptive practices, relying exclusively on disclosure requirements that have been heavily criticized.171
Likewise, commentators have criticized the CFTC for its limited
efforts regarding enforcement and investor protection. A CFTC internal review in 1994 “raised major questions about CFTC’s ability
to adequately perform its enforcement mission.”172 Former CFTC
Chair (now SEC Chair) Mary Schapiro conceded in a 2005 interview that the CFTC is less focused on investor protection than the
SEC, relying primarily on market mechanisms for regulating be-

J. on Legis. 123, 148 (2007) (describing the Federal Reserve’s authority, under current
law, to mandate improved disclosure).
168
The Federal Reserve’s disclosure requirements are contained in Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226 (2008). See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 38–43 (2008) (describing how consumer mistakes in understanding
terms of mortgage loans cost them “billions of dollars”); McCoy, supra note 167, at
123–24, 129–32 (describing inadequate disclosure requirements for mortgages, especially subprime mortgages).
169
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b-1 to -4
(2006).
170
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 168, at 88–89 & n. 287 (describing the Federal Reserve’s authority under the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act).
171
See, e.g., Nancy Trejos, Fed to Pursue Aggressive Checks on Credit Cards, Wash.
Post, May 2, 2008, at A1 (describing proposed regulations to change the Federal Reserve’s traditional policy of relying on disclosure with rules that would ban problematic practices and fees as “unfair or deceptive”); Associated Press, Feds Take Swipe
At Credit Card Rules, CBS News, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2008/12/18/business/main4675174.shtml (describing Federal Reserve adoption
of new rules governing late fees, double-cycle billing, interest rate increases, and
other credit card practices).
172
Markets and Trading Reorganization and Reform Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R.
718 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Banking & Financial Services, 104th Cong. 3
(1995) (statement of James Bothwell, Director, Financial Institutions and Markets
Issues General Government Division, General Accounting Office).
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havior.173 And CFTC rules have provided far less investor protection than those of the SEC.174
If we retain the SEC, can it be made more effective? A comprehensive treatment is beyond the scope of this article, but this section will suggest three measures that may provide at least a start.
The first recommendation is greater oversight of financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries—from investment advisors, to
broker-dealers, to mutual funds—participate in the vast majority of
financial transactions.175 They play a critical role in controlling the
investments of an ever-increasing percentage of retail investors.
Through their investment decisions and recommendations, they
also control the cost of capital for public issuers.
Financial intermediaries present several regulatory challenges.
Perhaps the most significant is that they create additional levels of
agency costs. Intermediaries, by definition, deal with other people’s
money. As such, they may lack adequate incentives to take appropriate levels of risk, to investigate thoroughly, or to disclose conflicts of interest. Compensation structures may increase agency
costs by encouraging a short term perspective, rewarding excessive
risk-taking, or incentivizing herding.
Many of the SEC’s most glaring deficiencies—from Madoff to
Bear Stearns to the NRSROs—have centered on intermediary
oversight.176 As indicated above, the SEC has freed institutional investors from many regulatory constraints with respect to their investment decisions. This freedom, in turn, makes it difficult to understand and value the assets held by institutions, which reduces
the ability of beneficial owners to understand and evaluate their
173

Orrick Client Alert, President-Elect Obama Names SEC and CFTC Chairmen
and Fed Governor, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/1575.pdf (quoting
2005 interview with Mary Schapiro).
174
See, e.g., Richard Carlucci, Note, Harmonizing U.S. Securities and Futures Regulations, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 461, 467–78 (2008) (describing differences
between SEC and CFTC customer protection rules including suitability requirement,
investment account protection, and prohibition of insider trading).
175
Madoff, for example, was able to extend the scale of his fraud through the complicity of investment advisors who, rather than investing client funds themselves, simply gave Madoff those funds to invest—often without telling their clients.
176
See also Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better off Today?, 2 Brook. J. Corp.
Fin. & Com. L. 303, 306 (2008) (identifying particular damage to retail investors resulting from intermediary misconduct such as the research analyst scandal, mutual
fund late trading, and broker-dealer conflicts of interest).
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agents’ investment decisions.177 The resulting lack of discipline increases agency costs. The SEC has also delegated extensive oversight responsibility to the industry itself, despite the industry’s limited incentives to regulate against its members’ self interest. This
delegation is particularly problematic with respect to enforcement
in which the industry has a long history of condoning unsafe and
unfair practices.178 Going forward, it is critical that the SEC address,
in a comprehensive manner, intermediary discipline, including the
regulation, through disclosure or otherwise of fees, sales practices,
and conflicts of interest.
Second, the SEC must improve its access to market data and developments. It must become more proactive in identifying trends,
evaluating existing regulation and understanding new financial
markets and products.179 Rather than relying on high level staffers,
who may be many years removed from the industries that they
regulate, the SEC should use industry consultants—who are compensated at market rates—to bring their expertise to the agency.
The SEC should make particular use of non-lawyer consultants including Wall Street traders, economists and buy-side investors.180
Similarly, the SEC should exercise its supervisory powers to collect
more extensive data on regulatory issues—ranging from the effectiveness of FINRA’s broker-dealer oversight to the allocation of
177
Beneficial owners are the ultimate source of the capital invested by institutional
investors. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Commentary, Individual Responsibility for the
Investment of Retirement Savings: A Cautionary View, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 1037, 1039
(1998) (explaining that “[i]nstitutional investors serve as financial intermediaries collecting capital from dispersed investors and in turn invest it in specific companies”).
178
Professors Coffee and Sale argue that shifting administration of net capital requirements to banking regulators would reduce the risk of regulatory capture. Coffee
& Sale, supra note 1, at 775. Separating prudential financial regulation from regulating record-keeping, order processing, customer protection, and other operations
may not be efficient, however, and it is unclear that the Federal Reserve has
sufficient expertise and concern with investor protection to oversee these other
aspects of investment banking regulation effectively.
179
Professors Coffee and Sale observe that the SEC is poorly positioned to address
derivatives regulation because of its lack of regulatory authority. Coffee & Sale, supra
note 1, at 776. As indicated above, the SEC has already attempted to address the
risk associated with derivatives trading by requiring increased disclosure of derivatives positions. See supra notes 123–126 and accompanying text. Moreover, in light of
the role of derivatives in the credit crisis, legislation increasing the SEC’s regulatory
authority over derivatives is not just politically plausible, but likely.
180
Use of such consultants would address Coffee & Sale’s concern over the agency’s
lack of expertise. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 1, at 744.
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settlement funds in private securities fraud litigation. The SEC
could hire empirical scholars to evaluate this data, or alternatively,
could make the data available for academic research under suitable
conditions. This process would harness the private incentives of researchers and enable the SEC to evaluate the effectiveness of its
regulatory policies.
Third, and perhaps most important, staffing at the SEC, including the appointment of SEC Commissioners, must reflect a renewed emphasis on leadership—leadership that entails a commitment to regulation.181 Although this article does not condone
excessive regulation or regulatory zeal, the nation’s top cop should
not be under the supervision of officials who espouse extensive deregulation.182 Such a perspective creates a negative tone at the top,
and may spawn situations like the Aguirre matter in which SEC
staff fear that their superiors will punish investigative and enforcement efforts that are politically problematic or target influential Wall Street insiders.183
In this vein, future policymakers, including the President, should
make a greater effort to include representation from the full range
of constituencies over which the SEC exercises power. Recent
staffing and appointments at the federal regulatory agencies have
181

See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman, Jeffrey S. Harrison & Andrew C. Wicks, Managing for Stakeholders: Survival, Reputation, and Success 17 (2007) (describing importance of “tone at the top” in connecting leadership and ethics). For a detailed analysis
of what leadership entails, including the creation of a vision for the future and a system for identifying and responding to breakdowns, see Allan L. Scherr & Michael C.
Jensen, A New Model of Leadership 32–33 (Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 06-10,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=920623. The various Inspector General
reports, and the SEC’s response to those reports, suggest a critical absence of these
functions.
182
As this article goes to press, the extent to which President Obama’s appointment
of Mary Schapiro reflects a change in leadership policy remains unclear. Compare
Randall Smith, Tom McGinty & Kara Scannell, Obama’s Pick to Head SEC Has Record of Being a Regulator with a Light Touch, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123194123553080959.html (criticizing Schapiro for failing to pursue “tough action against big Wall Street firms”), with Stephen Labaton,
S.E.C. Nominee Offers Plan for Tighter Regulation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2009, at B3
(describing Schapiro’s proposals for greater regulation of hedge funds and credit rating agencies).
183
See, e.g., Jesse Westbrook, Cox Quits at SEC, Leaves Schapiro to Restore Clout,
Bloomberg.com,
Jan.
21,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=email_en&refer=&sid=aJuH2AuRdpnA (quoting Columbia Law Professor
Harvey Goldschmid as criticizing lack of leadership and morale problems).
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reflected a strong bias in favor of lawyers (at the SEC) 184 and officials with sell-side expertise (at Treasury).185 In addition to the potential for skewing regulatory policy, the lack of diversity may
cause the SEC to succumb to similar biases as those of the constituencies that it regulates.186 In essence, this recommendation suggests that the President in appointing, and Congress in confirming,
SEC commissioners should be sensitive not only to political but
also to institutional perspectives and attempt to incorporate a sufficient range of viewpoints to allow the agency to operate independently of Wall Street financial firms, corporate issuers, and other influential market participants.
CONCLUSION
The credit crisis and other recent scandals have exposed widespread regulatory failures that offer little cause for celebrating the
current regulatory structure. Coffee and Sale provide a detailed
analysis of the CSE program, concluding from its failure that the
SEC is ill-suited to regulate the major investment banks. Their
conclusion seems to be borne out by those banks’ migration to
oversight by the Federal Reserve.
An eventual economic turnaround is likely to spawn the growth
of new investment banks which, along with hedge funds, private
equity, investment advisers and the like, will challenge the parameters of the current regulatory structure. Historically, our system has
drawn regulatory boundaries in terms of institution and product
type rather than regulatory mission. An increased emphasis on defining the appropriate regulatory objectives and designing an appropriate structure to address those objectives is a critical component of any substantial regulatory reform.

184

See, e.g., Harold Bradley, Whack-a-mole: The Story of Goldman Sachs and The
U.S. Economy, KansasCity.com, Jan. 9, 2009, http://economy.kansascity.com/
?q=node/776 (arguing that government leaders do not understand the financial markets: “Most SEC chiefs are lawyers; they’ve never made a trade in their lives”).
185
See id. (describing review of 100 resumes posted on Treasury department website
showing that only one official came from an investor’s background and the other 99
came from the “sellside”).
186
For a more detailed analysis of the potential for regulator bias and irrationality at
the SEC, see Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC,
56 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 6, 44, 56 (2003).
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The continued role of the SEC in the future of financial regulation remains unclear. This article argues that, although the precise
form of regulatory reform is not critical, the reform efforts must
emphasize transparency and enforcement. Despite the SEC’s recent shortcomings, its history as Wall Street’s most effective enforcer, coupled with its expertise at designing and enforcing disclosure requirements, make it the most plausible candidate for the
job. Increased intermediary oversight, a more vigorous and formalized program of obtaining and analyzing market data and developments, and a renewed emphasis on effective leadership will enable the agency to function more effectively. With these modest
improvements, the SEC may still be able to dance at its 100th
birthday.

